December 7th, 1992 was a cold Monday morning. My brother and I were getting ready for school when the phone rang a little after 6:45 am. Mom answered and immediately went into the bedroom to wake my father. There’d been an explosion at the South Mountain No. 3 mine and there was no communication with the men inside. The No. 3 mine was just down the road from where dad worked and was owned by the same man and company. He knew several of the men who worked there, some of whom were friends of the family.
Dad immediately drove to Guest River where the mines were located, seeing if there was anything he could do to help. When he returned, his face was grim. He told us how the heavy black conveyor belts used to transport coal out of the mine were hanging over the power lines, that a drink machine lay destroyed on the opposing hillside from the mine, having been blown across the hollow from the force of the blast, and that there was thick smoke billowing from the mine portals.
By midday television crews and reporters from all over the nation gathered to inform the rest of the world of the disaster. That evening, local news showed the scenes as dad had described. Smoke was continuing to pour from the portals, evidence of the fires still burning deep inside the mine. They explained how drilling crews had been brought in to drill down from the surface to take air samples of the mine. Despite the bleak situation, we all held hope that the men working the # 1 Left section were still alive and that mine rescue teams could reach them in time.
As rescue efforts continued, mine owner Ridley Elkins saw fit to keep the sister mine, Plowboy #4, running just up the road. Dad still had to report out to work for the evening shift, even though the coal seam they were mining was situated directly over top South Mountain No. 3. He knew that the test holes being drilled down from the surface were likely going to punch through the sealed sections of Plowboy #4.
Dad and a few other miners protested the mine running while the rescue efforts were still underway. Not only did they realize the danger that existed from the drilling, they had difficulty working while knowing their friends could still be alive and trapped from the explosion. To this day my dad still recalls passing by the South Mountain mine as he went to and from work, seeing it lit up at night with emergency personnel and news crews swarming the area. “It was the hardest thing I think I ever had to do,” he once told me solemnly. “Go to work knowing them boys was still trapped in that mine.”
Two and half days later mine rescue teams reached the section. All eight men had perished.
David K. Carlton
Danny R. Gentry
James E. “Garr” Mullins
Mike D. Mullins
Claude L. Sturgill
Palmer E. Sturgill
Norman D. Vanover
Elkins never shut down Plowboy #4—not even to give his other crews time to attend the funerals. He only gave my father and two others time off to attend, telling them coldly, “Just go home until them boys is buried.” Dad believes it was because he and the two others had called the federal mine inspectors that same day to report the dangers to everyone working at their own mine. He and several others quit the day after the funerals.
- Improperly conducted weekly examinations for the No. 3 Mine and the 001 section on November 21-30, 1992. The certified examiner failed to examine the bleeder system in its entirety due to adverse roof conditions.
- An inadequately conducted smoking search program. Smoking material was found with three of the victims, and a lunch container was found to contain two full packs of cigarettes and two cigarette lighters.
- Failure to conduct a thorough preshift examination on the 001 section between 9:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on December 6, 1992, for the oncoming midnight shift on the 1 Left 001 section.
- Improperly placed and maintained ventilation control devices.
- Failure to maintain the required incombustible content of the mine dust.
- Failure to follow the approved ventilation plan in the bleeder system inby No. 1 Left 001 section.
- Failure to provide the necessary volume and velocity of air in the 1 Left 001 section.
- Failure to conduct weekly examinations of the ventilation system at least every seven days.
But there was more to it than that.
The methane monitor on the continuous miner, a device meant to shut down the miner in the case methane levels increased to explosive levels had been bypassed (tampered with) to speed production. This, along with the failure of mine management, and some believe mine inspectors, to properly examine the ventilation systems as mandated by law, led to ventilation problems allowing methane to reach dangerously explosive levels. To save money on materials and labor, mine management had even failed to see that coal dust accumulations were kept in check by applying rock dust, an inert limestone powder meant to stifle coal dust’s ability to ignite when in the air.
Following the explosion, a great deal of controversy arose around whether state and federal mine inspectors had done their jobs, especially with regard to whether or not inspectors had physically gone into the mine to inspect mine ventilation, safety equipment, coal dust accumulation, and rock dust application. It had often been rumored that inspectors would just sit out in the office trailer of the mine site, shooting the breeze with mine managers, and in some cases, even accepting “gifts” from small coal company operators.
For once, community members hoped that the defunct system of mine safety regulation would be seen for what it truly was, and maybe, just maybe, the system would be fixed. But during the investigation, officials supposedly “found” cigarette lighters and cigarettes in one of the fallen miner’s dinner buckets and on their person. The smoking materials instantly became the focus of the disaster’s cause.
Family and friends of the fallen miners were outraged at the allegations.
People within the community, including other miners who worked for Elkins’ mining operations, suspected the cigarettes and lighters were planted during the investigation, put there to place blame on men who could not defend themselves. Many people still believe that this gave investigators a direct cause that would take attention away from the largest contributors to the explosion—the bypassed methane detector, the mine ventilation that was not kept in accordance with ventilation plans, the failure to keep coal dust under control by applying rock dust, and the failure of mine enforcement officials to properly inspect the mine for such flagrant mine safety violations.
Afterwards, lawsuits were brought against some of the mine management, including Elkins who would only spend six months in jail. The company was also fined $2,000,000, of which only a mere $900,000 was earmarked to go to the families of the fallen miners. This was the extent of punishment for the loss of eight men’s lives, men who worked hard just to support their families.
Several years later, the widows of the fallen miners filed a lawsuit against the Mine Safety and Health Administration for not performing their duty. The story made the papers when a federal judge exonerated the MSHA officials, stating the accident was a result of the mine owner’s failure to maintain safe working conditions.
Today, a drive up Guest River reveals little more than years of mining by various operations. Only those most familiar could find the site where the mine existed. There are no markers, no memorials or wreaths, only continued feelings of injustice for the eight loved ones who perished deep beneath the mountain.